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“What is metaphysics? ” The question awakens expectations o f  a 
discussion about metaphysics. This we will forgo. Instead we will take 
up a particular metaphysical question. In this way it seems we will let 
ourselves be transposed directly into metaphysics. Only in this way 
will we provide metaphysics the proper occasion to introduce itself
Martin Heidegger
Metaphysics begins from the moment when, ceasing to live in the 
evidence o f the object—whether it is the sensory object or the object 
o f science—we apperceive the radical subjectivity o f  all our experience 
as inseparable from its truth value. It means two things to say that our 
experience is our own: both that it is not the measure o f all imaginable 
being in itself and that it is nonetheless co-extensive with all being o f  
which we can form a notion. This double sense o f the cogito is the 
basic fact o f  metaphysics...
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
1. Introduction
Environmental Ethics is concerned with the values attached to the natural 
world. It deliberates on the appropriate ethical stance to be adopted by 
humans in order to protect or promote these values. The very possibility of
Revised version o f  a paper presented by the first author at the ICPR sponsored National 
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16-18,2007. The author thanks all the participants in the seminar as well as the anonymous 
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environmental ethics as an autonomous discipline is a matter of debate in 
contemporary writings on environmental philosophy. Of course, this debate 
presupposes many a metaphysical view about both “Man” and “Nature” 
besides meta-ethical questions regarding moral valuations on Nature. Most 
of the participants in the debate agree that environmental ethics would be 
possible only when man grants moral standing, besides humans, to all living 
entities other than humans. However, this raises a further problem of 
addressing the claims and counter claims that emanate from the conflicts 
of interests of the differing moral entities.1 From the metaphysical 
perspective of the relation between Man and Nature, there are two seemingly 
contrary moral positions namely, ‘eco-centrism’ and ‘anthropocentrism’; 
and as the quote from Merleau-Ponty mentioned above points out, both 
these positions implicate the ‘cogito’ in a double sense and accordingly 
would be part of metaphysics.2
Metaphysics, as Heidegger points out, is an .. inquiry beyond or over 
beings which aims to recover them as such and such as a whole for our 
grasp.”3 In what follows, we aim at understanding our own relationship 
with Nature, that too in its unity and entirety. Such an understanding, we 
believe, is metaphysical in the Heideggerian sense as it goes beyond the 
mere discussion on beings: whether “human” or “non-human” to bring back 
the relation among beings in their proper perspective—a “metaphysical” 
one at that. Accordingly, the paper begins with a discussion o f‘deep ecology’ 
in order to lay bare the metaphysical dimension o f ‘eco-centrism’ to which 
deep ecology belongs. However, as many environmentalists point out, deep 
ecology often run into conflict with “human rights” and engenders the debate 
on “saving nature versus feeding people”. Thus, the next section of the 
paper takes up the ‘anthropocentric’ perspective for critical scrutiny.
Unlike the older version o f ‘anthropocentrism’, where ‘man’ is regarded 
as the only source of value, modern anthropocentrism recognizes that the 
very survival of the humans necessitate a holistic perspective of nature that 
rejects the instrumental attitude that he/she hitherto adopted towards nature. 
Thus, the concluding section makes a case for “sustainability” as the goal
1. VanDe Veer, Donald and Pierce, Christine (ed.): The Environmental Ethics and Policy 
Book, p.37.
2. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice: Sense and Non-Sense, p. 93.
3. Heidegger, Martin: ‘What is Metaphysics?’ in David Farrell Krell (ed.): Martin 
Heidegger: Basic Writings, p. 109.
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of environmentalism by shifting the axis of the debate from ‘eco-centrism 
vs. an thropocentrism ’ to ‘strong anthropocentrism  vs. weak 
anthropocentrism’.
2. Eco-centrism: Relevance of Deep Ecology
All environmental ethical thinkers agree upon ‘nature’ as having ‘value’ 
which makes it worthy of moral consideration. Moreover, in order to sustain 
human community, it is necessary to take into account our concern towards 
Nature which thereby brings into the fore the domain of values. The question 
of value may be raised in terms of an instrumental concern or as intrinsic to 
the object. Deep Ecology believes that all living and non-living things have 
values in themselves, that is to say that it acknowledges the intrinsic value 
of Nature. Intrinsic value can be explained as value that the object of 
valuation has on its own accord rather than one that it inherits from the 
usefulness to the subject of valuation. Deep Ecology is thus a branch of 
Eco-philosophy that has been taking a more holistic view towards nature. It 
recognizes that humans are one among many other species that have 
developed in this global eco-system. Arne Naess emphasizes the intrinsic 
value of each living being. He explains that all entities have intrinsic value 
and we have an obligation in respecting the inherent value of beings in 
pursuing our interest. We are not supposed to diminish the potentiality of 
other entities. Though man has exceptional characteristics such as culture, 
communication skills, and soon, the other entities should also be treated on 
par with their sentience, the ability to feel pain or even the poetic properties 
of existence.
John O’Neill projects the importance o f‘intrinsic value’ in understanding 
our obligations towards other beings when he says, “Intrinsic goods are 
goods that other goods are good for the sake of. It is a well rehearsed point 
that, under pain o f an infinite regress, not everything can have only 
instrumental value.”4 Here, O’Neill mentions three varieties of intrinsic 
value with regard to Deep Ecology, which are often glossed over by many 
thinkers. First, as a synonym for non-instrumental value, secondly as to the 
value an object has solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties, and finally as a
4. O’Neill, John: “ The Varieties o f  Intrinsic Value” in Andrew Light and Hotmes Rolston 
III (ed.): Environmental Ethics, p. 131.
5. Objective value here refers to the value an object possesses independently o f  the 
values that are ascribed by the valuers.
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synonym for objective value.5 One who advocates an environmental ethics 
with the support of intrinsic values usually employs the first sense of intrinsic 
value that O’Neill discusses. However, O’Neill points out that in order to 
defend an environmental ethics based on intrinsic values one may have to 
commit to the other two senses of the notion o f intrinsic value. He takes up 
the notion of intrinsic value as one that depends solely on the non-relational 
properties of the object of valuation for further scrutiny. Non-relational 
properties.of an object are actually characterized as the intrinsic properties 
of that object. O’Neill interprets the term non-relational properties in two 
senses, a weak and a strong sense. To quote O’Neill:
(i) The non-relational properties of an object are those that persist 
regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects (weak 
interpretation)
(ii) The non-relational properties of an object are those that can be 
characterized without reference to other object (strong interpretation).6
If we take intrinsic value in any of the senses of the two interpretations " 
given above, we will end up with a problematic conception of environmental 
ethics. As O’Neill shows ‘rarity’ is a property that is relational, as it cannot 
be characterized without reference to other objects. Thus, the existence of 
a species as a ‘rare’ one obviously depends on the ‘abundance’ of other 
species. Now, going by the above interpretation of intrinsic value, the ‘rare’ 
species does not qualify to be considered in an environmental ethics that is 
founded on the notion of intrinsic value. However, we very well know that 
‘rarity’ confers a special value to the objects and the preservation of such 
rare species is of utmost concern for a practicing environmentalist. O’Neill 
says that this absurdity is the result of the equivocation we commit with 
regard to the term ‘intrinsic value’. This can be stated without absurdity if 
we distinguish between the two kinds of ‘relatedness’ regarding values:
(1) values objects can have in virtue of their relations to other objects;
and
(2) values objects can have in virtue of their relations to human beings.7
Now, we should note here that the values mentioned in the second set is
6. O’N eill, John, Op.cit., p. 134.
7. Ibid., p. 134.
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not the same as values that are so solely in virtue of being instrumental for 
human satisfaction. In other words, something may have value by virtue of 
its relation to human beings, yet it need not be only of instrumental value for 
humans.
Aldo Leopold incorporates intrinsic value in the organic world and thus 
brings in the notion of relatedness with regard to the intrinsic value. He 
conceives the land and its functions in a broader perspective. Leopold 
observes:
“Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through 
a circuit of soils, plants and animals.Food chains are the living channels 
which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. The 
circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in decay, some is added by 
absorption from the air, some is stored in soils, peats and long- lived forests; 
but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly augmented revolving fund of 
life.. .The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on 
the complex structure of the plant and animal community, much as the 
upward flow of sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organization. 
Without this complexity, normal circulation would presumably not occur.”8
Leopold’s concept of “land ethics” thus originates from his understanding 
of land and other forms of life as interrelated. It is this very same notion of 
interrelatedness that characterizes the metaphysics of Deep Ecology.
Arne Naess’ distinction between Deep and Shallow ecology was so 
seminal that in a way the subsequent debates in environmental ethics move 
around Naess’s work. According to him, shallow ecology views humans 
and their environment as separate entities. It institutes a Dualism between 
man and Nature. Nature seems to be the other of man and has only an 
instrumental value, man being the center of value. Deep Ecology on the 
other hand projects “the relational or total-field” image of the environment 
and man. It rejects the image that dualistic metaphysics imposes, namely 
“human-in-environment.”9 The intuition of Deep Ecology that everything is 
interrelated can be seen at work in the metaphysics of ancient cultures, 
which revered Nature. All entities somehow have a role in making the 
environment as ‘Valuable’. Humans, animals, other species of organisms,
8. Leopold, Aldo: A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There, p. 216.
9. Naess, Arne: “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A
Summary.” Inquiry, Vol. 16,1973, p.95. '
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and eco-systems guide each other in exploring values. According to Deep 
Ecology, organisms are best viewed as ‘knots’ in the biosphere net or field 
of intrinsic relations. Deep Ecology thus views humans as just one 
constituency among others in the biotic community. It replaces the 
mechanistic materialism with a better ‘code of reading nature’. This code 
may be described as one of ‘Unity in processes’. By this it means both the 
idea that all ‘things’ are fundamentally, that is, internally related and the 
idea that these interrelationships are in constant flux. In stressing the 
interconnection between ethics and metaphysics, deep ecology recognizes 
that an ecologically effective ethics can only arise within the context of a 
more persuasive and more enchanting cosmology than that o f mechanistic 
materialism. Deep ecology is concerned with address existing social, political 
and economic arrangements and to replace the ideology of economic growth 
with the ideology of ecological sustainability.
Warwick Fox interprets the central intuition of deep ecology with 
reference to Buddhist visionaries and TAOIST physics. According to him, 
the Shallow/Deep ecology distinction is one that is not so simple and easily 
characterized as it appears. However, for the sake o f argument, Fox 
characterizes shallow ecology in the following way. Firstly, shallow ecology 
views humans as separate from their environment. Shallow ecology thus 
views humans as the source of all value and ascribes only instrumental 
value to the non-human world. This then is akin to Anthropocentrism, which 
says, “We ought to preserve the environment not for its own sake but because 
of its value to us.” Secondly, shallow ecology views humans as the source 
or ground of all value, man as the measure of all things. Finally, shallow 
ecology tends to acdept the social, political and economic projects of 
mechanistic materialism, which has become the characteristics of industrial 
and developing societies.10
The relevance of Deep Ecology can be seen from the fact that nature 
cannot be understood purely in mechanistic terms. Deep Ecology is more 
concerned than other approaches with the understanding of nature as a 
living organism. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Ontology is here relevant to 
understand the basic presupposition of the philosophy of Deep Ecology. 
According to Merleau-Ponty the self and non-self, human and non-human
10. Cf. Fox, Warwick: “Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy o f Our Time?” In Andrew 
Light and Holmes Rolston III (ed.) Environmental Ethics, p.253.
11. Langer, Monika: “Merleau Ponty and Deep Ecology”, in Galen A Johnson and Michael 
B. Smith (ed.): Ontology and Alterity in Merleau Ponty, p. 115.
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intertwine in a mutual unfolding.1' Thus, the comprehension o f other, 
including non-human nature itself becomes a relation o f ‘embrace’ with the 
other. Ontology and alterity, thus understood, put us well on the way to 
resolving the environmental crisis.
This new ontology, which is a break from the Cartesian dualism that 
conceives nature as a lifeless machine calls for an inquiry that is holistic 
and transdisciplinary and directs itself to the pre-personal, personal and 
transperonsal levels of experience. It involves an inherently ongoing “dialogue 
with nature.” On the other hand, Cartesian dualistic ontology encourages 
Science to manipulate nature. Its fundamental bias is to treat everything as 
though it were an object, as though it meant nothing to us. Having lost any 
feeling for the opaqueness of the world, scientific thinking “has become a 
sort of absolute artificialism, which threatens to precipitate a sleep or a 
nightmare, from which there is no awakening.”12 Nevertheless, Deep 
ecologists need not ask for the abolishment of science, but of “understanding 
its meaning and scope, revealing its implicit ontology and questioning its 
pretension to absoluteness. Science separates vision and the visible, between 
thought and being and leaves us with ‘mutilated fragments’ of reality.”13
Understood from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, Deep 
Ecology asks us to situate ourselves within the being we are dealing with, 
instead of looking at it from the outside. Thus, Deep Ecology aims to 
understand the relations of consciousness and nature. It calls for a 
fundamentally different conception of nature, consciousness and 
understanding itself. It would consider the physical, vital and mental to be 
three significations or three forms of unity. For Deep Ecology, it is impossible 
to say that nature ends here and that man or other forms of reality start 
there. The ontology of ‘Deep Ecology’ shows that organism’s behaviour 
manifests ‘intrinsic value’ and meaning. The ontology of deep ecology 
enables us to see more clearly, the absence of dichotomy between nature 
and culture. Matter, life and mind are philosophical instruments to understand 
‘ontological intrinsic value’ of beings. It brings to the fore the relevance of 
intrinsic value in all organic beings, processes and systems. The explanations 
that conceive the relevance and consequences of Deep Ecology perceived 
truly that human life should be in accordance with the harmony of nature.
12. Ibid, pp. 120-121.
13. Ibid, p. 121.
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3. Anthropocentrism: The Return of the Prodigal Son
There are environmentalists who feel that the emphasis on wilderness 
preservation as well as preserving biotic diversity to the detriment of human 
needs by Deep Ecologists is problematical. Thus, Guha opines that 
uncompromising commitment to deep ecology leads to the deprivation of 
the poor and is incapable of addressing the pressing environmental crises of 
the Third World.14 It tends to benefit the rich and encourages imperialistic 
outlook of Western conservationists. According to Bookchin, hierarchy and 
domination are the sources of all socio-political aberrations, including 
environmental degradation. Thus, Bookchin questions the wisdom of those, 
for example the Deep Ecologists, who see the domination of some people 
by others as a consequence rather than a cause of environmental exploitation. 
He criticizes the deep ecologists for what he calls their ‘misanthropy’. that 
is the view that humanity is essentially an “ugly anthropocentric” thing, a 
“malignant product” of evolution, which overpopulates the world and devours 
its resources, destroys its wildlife and the biosphere.15
Anthropocentrism in environmental philosophy accords only an 
instrumental value to nature and non-human beings. It assumes humans as 
qualitatively different from non-human beings. Anthropocentrism, following 
Naess’ distinction may be termed ‘Shallow Ecology’. It considers the values 
of nature to be instrumental to humans. Even though there is the acceptance 
of certain rights of non-human beings, it is strictly secondary to human 
world. Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics or shallow ecology emphasizes 
the relationship between individuals and is said to be atomistic. Immanuel 
Kant may be considered as one who clearly argued for this form of 
anthropocentrism in olden days. According to Kant only rational beings 
deserve moral consideration.15 He believed that rationality has intrinsic value 
and hence worth seeking in itself as far as any rational being is concerned. 
Morally correct behaviour for rational beings is to help each other thereby 
contributing to their common goal of realizing a rational world. If rational
14. Guha, Ramachandra: ‘Radical American Environm entalism  and W ilderness 
Preservation: A Third World Critique.’in Richard G Botzler and Susan J. Armstrong 
(ed.): Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, p. 296.
15. Bookchin, Murray: ‘Social Ecology Versus “Deep” Ecology’, Green Perspectives: 
Newsletter o f  the Green Program Project, Vol. 4/5(Double Issue), Summer 1987, 
pp. 1-23. Cited in Peter Hay: A Companion to Environmental Thought, p.66.
16. Kant, Immanuel: ‘Duties to Animals’ in Richard G Botzler and Susan J. Armstrong 
(ed.): Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, p. 312.
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beings bring harm to each other for personal gains, the attainment of a 
rational world would never be realized. Kant believed that only rational 
beings contribute directly to achieve the intrinsic good o f the rational world. 
Since non-rational beings do not contribute directly to the making of the 
rational world, the way they are treated by rational beings does not matter 
for the attainment of the rational world. Hence, according to Kant it is 
quite justifiable to use non-rational beings as a means to the end of realizing 
the rational world.
An economic understanding of man’s behaviour as portrayed in 
conventional economics points out that both consumers and producers wish 
to maximize their satisfaction from a transaction. Consumers want some 
form of contentment from the purchase and the producers want to make a 
profit from it. Conventional economics assumes that both the consumers 
and the producers are in possession of perfect information about the state 
of market and of sources of alternatives and that, the supplier does not 
have a monopoly of the product. This assumption thus has given to a 
tendency to construct highly rationalist models in economic theory, which 
does not always fit well with the world of reality. This then prompted the 
idea of ‘conservation’ within environmental discourse as well as a whole 
branch of economics known as environmental economics.
The conservation movement had scientific backing. Some of the pioneers 
of conservationism such as Gifford Pinchot had a scientific training. The 
emphasis of conservation movement was on wise management of natural 
resources. Pinchot observes:
“The first great fact about conservation is that it stands for development. 
There has been a fundamental misconception that conservation means 
nothing but the husbanding of resources for future generations. There could 
be no more serious mistake. Conservation does mean provision for the 
future, but it means also and first of all the recognition of the right of the 
present generation to the fullest necessary use of all the resources with 
which this country is abundantly blessed. Conservation demands the welfare 
of this generation first, and afterward the welfare of the generations to 
follow. The first principle of conservation is development, the use of the 
natural resources now existing on this continent for the benefit of the people 
who live here now.”17
17. Quoted in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (ed.):77je Environmental Ethics 
and Policy Book, p. 175.
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Pinchot always emphasized that the object of conservation is not to 
preserve the forests because they are beautiful or they shelter wild animals 
but to better human standard of living.
I f ‘conservationism’ owes a great deal to science, the normative aspects 
o f arts and aesthetics inspired the ‘preservationist’ paradigm in 
environmental ethics. Thus, John Muir, a contemporary of Pinchot argued 
for preservation of the wilderness for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. For 
Muir nature provides spiritual as well as aesthetic experience. Muir says:
“Watch the sunbeams over the forest awakening the flowers, feeding 
them every one, warming, reviving the myriads of the air, setting countless 
wings in motion—making diamonds of dew drops, lakes, painting the spray 
of falls in rainbow colors. Enjoy the great night like a day, hinting the eternal 
and imperishable in nature amid the transient and material.”'8
The point to be noted here is that though Muir’s ‘Preservationism’ clashes 
with Pinchot’s ‘Conservationism’19 both are anthropocentric, for one argues 
for the conservation of nature from economic resource perspective with 
the goal of betterment of human life, the other argues for the preservation 
of nature for the satisfaction of certain peak experiences of humans.
Anthropocentrism is thus intended as a means to an end, which we may 
call as sustainable economic system in the case of conservationism and 
spiritual and aesthetic joy in the case of preservationism. As Murdy points 
out humankind is to be valued more highly than other things in nature by 
humans. It is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for spiders to be 
arachnocentric.20 This goes for all other living species. Thus, Simpson 
argues that:
18. Muir, John: To Yosemite and Beyond, Writings from the Years 1863-1875, Quoted in 
Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (ed.), Op.Cit, p. 175.
19. A concrete case where the two paradigms came into conflict may be seen in the 
controversy over the Hetch Hetchy Valley in California. The preservationists led by 
Muir fought for the preservation o f the Heth Hetchy Valley when the city o f  San 
Francisco wanted to set up a dam in the area. Pinchot and other conservationists 
supported the move o f  the city administrators as according to them the dam would 
resolve the problem o f  water supply faced by the people.
20. Murdy, William H.: ‘Anthropocentrism a Moden Version’ in Richard G Botzler and 
Susan J. Armstrong (ed.): Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, pp. 
316-317.
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“Man is the highest animal. The fact that he alone is capable of making 
such judgement is in itself part of the evidence that this decision is correct. 
And even if he were the lowest animal, the anthropocentric point o f view 
would still be manifestly the only proper one to adopt for consideration of 
his place in the scheme of things and when seeking a guide on which to 
base his actions and his evaluations of them.”21
Darwin’s account of natural selection confirms the above view. As 
Darwin points out species exists as ends in themselves. If it is so, then it is 
only natural for man to behave in a manner that is conducive to his own 
survival. In other words, man has the freedom to exploit nature for his 
proper ends. Thus, Murdy argues that Lynn W hite’s criticism o f 
anthropocentrism is not justified, though he was right in reminding us how 
sadly short sighted we were in our mindless exploitation of nature. We may 
note here that the problem lies in selecting the ‘proper ends’. We find it 
difficult to decide which end as progressive and thus needs to be promoted 
and which end as retrogressive and hence to be discarded.
The dualistic approach in Anthropocentrism eschews the fundamental 
equality of all life forms. The critics o f anthropocentrism affirm that all 
species have equal rights. This however is a problematic notion as it 
becomes necessary for us to destroy pathogenic bacteria; unless we do 
that, our own existence is under peril. O f course this does not sanction the 
wanton destruction of all life forms simply because they serve no useful 
purpose to man. Anthropocentric point of view ascribes value to things of 
nature as they benefit man. This is Clearly an instrumentalist notion of 
value. Nevertheless, as recent developments in ecological sciences reveal 
our dependent relationships with nature makes it imperative to value a variety 
of things in nature. Thus, anthropocentrism now recognizes that an 
individual’s well-being is dependent on the well-being of the ecological 
support system as a whole. Murdy points out:
“Continued growth of knowledge may lead to an awareness that no 
event in nature is without some effect on the whole of which we are a part 
and therefore we should value all items in nature.”22
21. Simpson, GG: The Meaning o f  Evolution, p.286. Quoted in William H. Murdy, 
Op.Cit, p.3I6.
22. Murdy, William H.: Op.Cit, p. 317.
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Thus, the modem view of anthropocentrism in environmental ethics 
holds that our anthropocentric attitude towards nature does not require that 
man be the source of all value; nor does it exclude a belief that things of 
nature have intrinsic value. Rather what it emphasizes is that though all 
species have intrinsic value, humans should behave in a manner that enables 
his/her survival than the survival of any other species. Moreover, 
anthropocentrism argues that humans are better judges as to what course 
of action to be taken keeping in view the entire ecological support system. 
According to anthropocentrism this is inevitable as humans are the only 
species the evolutionary process has ever produced that has culture and 
the requisite knowledge to shape the nature in any significant way that 
takes into account the ecological balance as a whole. The fact that we 
collectively failed in carrying out this task is no argument to deny the 
preeminent role humans have in the course of nature. As Murdy contends:
“The ‘ecological crisis’ is basically a crisis in human evolution. Modem 
man stands at a crossroads. Continued geometric growth in human numbers, 
consumption of resources, and pollution of environments will propel mankind
down a road of diminished options...... It is anthropocentric to value the
factors that make us uniquely human, to seek to preserve and enhance 
such factors and to counter antihuman forces which threaten to diminish or 
destroy them. Nature outside of man will not act to preserve human values: 
it is our responsibility alone.”23
When we assert the survival of our own species, the intrinsic value of 
other non-human beings may be neglected. However, we may better remind 
us of what Teilhard*de Chardin says about the future of man. Though man 
is not the measure of all things and not the source of all value, he is “the 
present crest of the evolutionary wave.”24 This comes with a responsibility 
for man to live up to the exalted status he has in nature. It calls upon us to 
strive for a comprehensive understanding of our relationships to the larger 
environment of which we are a part. This has to be achieved without 
relegating the human reality in any manner. As Murdy argues:
“Effective participation in our own evolution requires not only that we 
establish a harmonious relationship to larger wholes, but in addition that we
23. Murdy, William H.: Op.Cit, p. 321.
24. de Chardin, Teilhard: The Future o f  Man, p. 237. Quoted in William H. Murdy: 
Op.Cit, p. 322.
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affirm the human phenomenon to be a vitally significant process in its own 
right and our individual selves to be holistic centers.”25
Midgley offers a critical account of man being central to the cosmos. 
The Enlightenment world-view had placed man at the center of the universe. 
However, the subsequent developments in our scientific understanding as 
well as the progressive ideals that inform a democratic form of governance 
have eroded the certainty with which we had placed ourselves at the center 
of the cosmos. Of course, there still is the view that we are the center as 
it is our own lives, and our own species that provide the natural focus on the 
universe. Thus, Midgley agrees that the perspective from which we see 
things is bound to be our own and in that sense, we still are the center of the 
universe. Each one of us is at the relative center of a particular life. Thus, 
we may have no other choice but to be interested in ourselves and those 
around us. Bishop Butler notes that unless we have not enough self-love 
we cannot love others. However, as Butler points out:
“The trouble with human beings is not really that they love themselves 
too much; they ought to love themselves more. The trouble is simply that 
they don’t love others enough.”26
When we turn from self-centered individualism to species politics, things 
get more complicated. Here people tend to see themselves as placed at the 
objective center of everything and not just the perspectival subjective center 
of a particular life. Enlightenment view of Kant gives us such an objective 
view of us being the center of everything. Kant says:
“As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, man is 
certainly titular lord of nature and, supposing we regard nature as a 
teleological system, he is bom to be its ultimate end.”27
Midgley draws our attention to the three themes that Kant states here, 
namely the claim to dominance, the emphasis on intellect as its ground, and 
the reference to cosmic teleology. Thus, the Enlightenment rationality 
construes humans at the center o f the cosmos. It is this notion of
25. Murdy, William H.: Op. Cit, p. 322.
26. Butler, Joseph: B u tler's Serm ons. C ited in M idgley, Mary: ‘The End o f  
Anthropocentrism?’ in Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (ed.): Philosophy and Natural 
Environment, p. 103.
27. Quoted in Midgley, Mary: Op.Cit, p.104.
40 Koshy Tharakan
preeminence of man that led him to exploit the nature and subjugate all 
other forms of being.
4. Conclusion.
The recent developments in science have eroded the kind of confidence 
that the ‘enlightenment rationality’ instilled in us with regard to our own 
place in the whole of nature. Our conception of the universe has now changed 
and accordingly we have now realized that man is not the center of the 
cosmos. In fact, the very talk of being at the center has become 
problematical. As Midgley points out we now accept that the universe is 
much larger and much less neatly organized that literally speaking the very 
idea of it having a center does not make any sense. Ecology tells us that 
unless we heed the guiding principles of nature, rather than distorting it to 
suit our conveniences, we must be heralding a catastrophe that would wipe 
out the present life forms including us. Thus, Midgley notes:
“The teleological assumptions that seemed to hold the symbolic core of 
‘anthropocentrism’ in place are themselves no longer deemed scientific. 
The idea of a central cosmic purpose is as foreign to modem science as the 
idea of a central location is. The word ‘anthropocentric’ itself seems to 
have been invented to make just this point. Thus the Oxford English 
Dictionary quotes Haeckel... writing in 1876 of ‘the anthropocentric error, 
that man is the premeditated aim of the creation of the earth.”28
The kind of anthropocentrism that would always privilege human interests 
above those of othej; life forms is no longer defensible, given our current 
ecological understanding. This does not, however mean that anthropocentrism 
is no longer valid. On the contrary as pointed out by Butler, we need to 
show concern for ourselves, our own species, which alone would prepare 
us to recognize the value of other beings. This anthropocentric concern 
would now make us realize that to save human beings, we need to save the 
entire biosphere from wanton destruction and exploitation. Thus, we now 
have the task of reinterpreting anthropocentrism itself and an attempt in 
that direction is offered by Brian Norton.
Norton points out that many consider the possibility of environmental 
ethics as a distinctive form of inquiry, distinct from traditional ethics, is
28. Quoted in Midgley, Mary: Op.Cit, p. 107.
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conditional on the rejection of anthropocentrism. That is, the distinctiveness 
of environmental ethics is thought to be based upon principles that attribute 
intrinsic value to nature, independent of human value. Consequently, it is 
argued that one has to reject anthropocentrism that treat humans as the 
only loci of intrinsic value. However, Norton calls into question the 
equivalence by arguing that the usual debate between anthropocentrism 
and non-anthropocentrism is of far less importance than is usually held. 
Thus, Norton argues that non-anthropocentrism is not the only adequate 
basis for a genuine environmental ethics.
According to Norton, environmental ethics cannot be derived from either 
rights or interests of non-humans or from rights or interests of future 
generations o f hum ans.29 He distinguishes between two forms of 
anthropocentrism , namely strong anthropocentrism  and weak 
anthropocentrism. Our failure to distinguish between these two forms had 
in fact resulted in the privileging of non-anthropocentrism in environmental 
ethical discourse. According to Norton:
“A value theory is strongly anthropocentric if all value countenanced 
by it is explained by reference to satisfactions of felt preferences of human 
individuals. A value theory is weakly anthropocentric if  all value 
countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt 
preference of a human individual or by reference to its bearing upon the 
ideals which exist as elements in a world view essential to determinations 
of considered preferences.”30
In strong anthropocentrism there exists no means to criticize the 
exploitative attitude of individuals who consider nature merely as a resource 
of raw materials to be used for human preferences and needs. Weak 
anthropocentrism takes our felt preferences as either rational or irrational; 
and is thus capable of criticizing the exploitative attitudes of humans. Weak 
anthropocentrism as Norton points out has the potential to address the 
environmental issues in an authentic manner. Weak anthropocentrism values 
nature and nonhuman entities for more than their use in satisfying 
unreflective human desires and needs. Rather it values them for enriching
29. Norton, Brian G: ‘Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism’ in Andrew 
Light and Holmes Rolston III (ed.), Environmental Ethics, p,163.
30. Ibid. p. 165. A felt preference is a desire or need o f  an individual prompting him to act 
in accordance with the same without any rational assessment o f the desire. In contrast, 
a considered preference is a desire or need that one expresses after careful deliberation.
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human nature—a lesson we learn from the homecoming of the one who 
had gone astray. The realization that the very existence of humans depend 
on the proper balance between ‘man and nature’ is what gave rise to the 
ideal o f ‘sustainable development’ in our times.
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